mirror of
https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy.git
synced 2024-12-16 21:56:40 -05:00
787 lines
29 KiB
Go
787 lines
29 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2015 Matthew Holt and The Caddy Authors
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//
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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package httpcaddyfile
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import (
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"bytes"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"reflect"
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"slices"
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"sort"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"github.com/caddyserver/certmagic"
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"github.com/mholt/acmez/v2/acme"
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"github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2"
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"github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/caddyconfig"
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"github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddyhttp"
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"github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddytls"
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)
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func (st ServerType) buildTLSApp(
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pairings []sbAddrAssociation,
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options map[string]any,
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warnings []caddyconfig.Warning,
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) (*caddytls.TLS, []caddyconfig.Warning, error) {
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tlsApp := &caddytls.TLS{CertificatesRaw: make(caddy.ModuleMap)}
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var certLoaders []caddytls.CertificateLoader
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httpPort := strconv.Itoa(caddyhttp.DefaultHTTPPort)
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if hp, ok := options["http_port"].(int); ok {
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httpPort = strconv.Itoa(hp)
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}
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autoHTTPS := []string{}
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if ah, ok := options["auto_https"].([]string); ok {
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autoHTTPS = ah
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}
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// find all hosts that share a server block with a hostless
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// key, so that they don't get forgotten/omitted by auto-HTTPS
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// (since they won't appear in route matchers)
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httpsHostsSharedWithHostlessKey := make(map[string]struct{})
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if !slices.Contains(autoHTTPS, "off") {
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for _, pair := range pairings {
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for _, sb := range pair.serverBlocks {
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for _, addr := range sb.parsedKeys {
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if addr.Host != "" {
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continue
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}
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// this server block has a hostless key, now
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// go through and add all the hosts to the set
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for _, otherAddr := range sb.parsedKeys {
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if otherAddr.Original == addr.Original {
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continue
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}
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if otherAddr.Host != "" && otherAddr.Scheme != "http" && otherAddr.Port != httpPort {
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httpsHostsSharedWithHostlessKey[otherAddr.Host] = struct{}{}
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}
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}
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break
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}
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}
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}
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}
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// a catch-all automation policy is used as a "default" for all subjects that
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// don't have custom configuration explicitly associated with them; this
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// is only to add if the global settings or defaults are non-empty
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catchAllAP, err := newBaseAutomationPolicy(options, warnings, false)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, warnings, err
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}
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if catchAllAP != nil {
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if tlsApp.Automation == nil {
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tlsApp.Automation = new(caddytls.AutomationConfig)
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}
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tlsApp.Automation.Policies = append(tlsApp.Automation.Policies, catchAllAP)
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}
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// collect all hosts that have a wildcard in them, and arent HTTP
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wildcardHosts := []string{}
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for _, p := range pairings {
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var addresses []string
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for _, addressWithProtocols := range p.addressesWithProtocols {
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addresses = append(addresses, addressWithProtocols.address)
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}
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if !listenersUseAnyPortOtherThan(addresses, httpPort) {
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continue
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}
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for _, sblock := range p.serverBlocks {
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for _, addr := range sblock.parsedKeys {
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if strings.HasPrefix(addr.Host, "*.") {
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wildcardHosts = append(wildcardHosts, addr.Host[2:])
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}
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}
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}
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}
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for _, p := range pairings {
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// avoid setting up TLS automation policies for a server that is HTTP-only
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var addresses []string
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for _, addressWithProtocols := range p.addressesWithProtocols {
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addresses = append(addresses, addressWithProtocols.address)
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}
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if !listenersUseAnyPortOtherThan(addresses, httpPort) {
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continue
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}
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for _, sblock := range p.serverBlocks {
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// check the scheme of all the site addresses,
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// skip building AP if they all had http://
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if sblock.isAllHTTP() {
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continue
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}
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// get values that populate an automation policy for this block
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ap, err := newBaseAutomationPolicy(options, warnings, true)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, warnings, err
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}
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// make a plain copy so we can compare whether we made any changes
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apCopy, err := newBaseAutomationPolicy(options, warnings, true)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, warnings, err
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}
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sblockHosts := sblock.hostsFromKeys(false)
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if len(sblockHosts) == 0 && catchAllAP != nil {
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ap = catchAllAP
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}
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// on-demand tls
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if _, ok := sblock.pile["tls.on_demand"]; ok {
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ap.OnDemand = true
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}
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// reuse private keys tls
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if _, ok := sblock.pile["tls.reuse_private_keys"]; ok {
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ap.ReusePrivateKeys = true
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}
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if keyTypeVals, ok := sblock.pile["tls.key_type"]; ok {
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ap.KeyType = keyTypeVals[0].Value.(string)
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}
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// certificate issuers
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if issuerVals, ok := sblock.pile["tls.cert_issuer"]; ok {
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var issuers []certmagic.Issuer
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for _, issuerVal := range issuerVals {
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issuers = append(issuers, issuerVal.Value.(certmagic.Issuer))
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}
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if ap == catchAllAP && !reflect.DeepEqual(ap.Issuers, issuers) {
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// this more correctly implements an error check that was removed
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// below; try it with this config:
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//
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// :443 {
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// bind 127.0.0.1
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// }
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//
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// :443 {
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// bind ::1
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// tls {
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// issuer acme
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// }
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// }
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return nil, warnings, fmt.Errorf("automation policy from site block is also default/catch-all policy because of key without hostname, and the two are in conflict: %#v != %#v", ap.Issuers, issuers)
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}
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ap.Issuers = issuers
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}
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// certificate managers
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if certManagerVals, ok := sblock.pile["tls.cert_manager"]; ok {
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for _, certManager := range certManagerVals {
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certGetterName := certManager.Value.(caddy.Module).CaddyModule().ID.Name()
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ap.ManagersRaw = append(ap.ManagersRaw, caddyconfig.JSONModuleObject(certManager.Value, "via", certGetterName, &warnings))
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}
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}
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// custom bind host
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for _, cfgVal := range sblock.pile["bind"] {
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for _, iss := range ap.Issuers {
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// if an issuer was already configured and it is NOT an ACME issuer,
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// skip, since we intend to adjust only ACME issuers; ensure we
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// include any issuer that embeds/wraps an underlying ACME issuer
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var acmeIssuer *caddytls.ACMEIssuer
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if acmeWrapper, ok := iss.(acmeCapable); ok {
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acmeIssuer = acmeWrapper.GetACMEIssuer()
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}
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if acmeIssuer == nil {
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continue
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}
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// proceed to configure the ACME issuer's bind host, without
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// overwriting any existing settings
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if acmeIssuer.Challenges == nil {
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acmeIssuer.Challenges = new(caddytls.ChallengesConfig)
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}
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if acmeIssuer.Challenges.BindHost == "" {
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// only binding to one host is supported
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var bindHost string
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if asserted, ok := cfgVal.Value.(addressesWithProtocols); ok && len(asserted.addresses) > 0 {
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bindHost = asserted.addresses[0]
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}
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acmeIssuer.Challenges.BindHost = bindHost
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}
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}
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}
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// we used to ensure this block is allowed to create an automation policy;
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// doing so was forbidden if it has a key with no host (i.e. ":443")
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// and if there is a different server block that also has a key with no
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// host -- since a key with no host matches any host, we need its
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// associated automation policy to have an empty Subjects list, i.e. no
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// host filter, which is indistinguishable between the two server blocks
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// because automation is not done in the context of a particular server...
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// this is an example of a poor mapping from Caddyfile to JSON but that's
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// the least-leaky abstraction I could figure out -- however, this check
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// was preventing certain listeners, like those provided by plugins, from
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// being used as desired (see the Tailscale listener plugin), so I removed
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// the check: and I think since I originally wrote the check I added a new
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// check above which *properly* detects this ambiguity without breaking the
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// listener plugin; see the check above with a commented example config
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if len(sblockHosts) == 0 && catchAllAP == nil {
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// this server block has a key with no hosts, but there is not yet
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// a catch-all automation policy (probably because no global options
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// were set), so this one becomes it
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catchAllAP = ap
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}
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hostsNotHTTP := sblock.hostsFromKeysNotHTTP(httpPort)
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sort.Strings(hostsNotHTTP) // solely for deterministic test results
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// if the we prefer wildcards and the AP is unchanged,
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// then we can skip this AP because it should be covered
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// by an AP with a wildcard
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if slices.Contains(autoHTTPS, "prefer_wildcard") {
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if hostsCoveredByWildcard(hostsNotHTTP, wildcardHosts) &&
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reflect.DeepEqual(ap, apCopy) {
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continue
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}
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}
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// associate our new automation policy with this server block's hosts
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ap.SubjectsRaw = hostsNotHTTP
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// if a combination of public and internal names were given
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// for this same server block and no issuer was specified, we
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// need to separate them out in the automation policies so
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// that the internal names can use the internal issuer and
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// the other names can use the default/public/ACME issuer
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var ap2 *caddytls.AutomationPolicy
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if len(ap.Issuers) == 0 {
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var internal, external []string
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for _, s := range ap.SubjectsRaw {
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// do not create Issuers for Tailscale domains; they will be given a Manager instead
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if isTailscaleDomain(s) {
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continue
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}
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if !certmagic.SubjectQualifiesForCert(s) {
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return nil, warnings, fmt.Errorf("subject does not qualify for certificate: '%s'", s)
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}
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// we don't use certmagic.SubjectQualifiesForPublicCert() because of one nuance:
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// names like *.*.tld that may not qualify for a public certificate are actually
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// fine when used with OnDemand, since OnDemand (currently) does not obtain
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// wildcards (if it ever does, there will be a separate config option to enable
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// it that we would need to check here) since the hostname is known at handshake;
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// and it is unexpected to switch to internal issuer when the user wants to get
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// regular certificates on-demand for a class of certs like *.*.tld.
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if subjectQualifiesForPublicCert(ap, s) {
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external = append(external, s)
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} else {
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internal = append(internal, s)
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}
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}
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if len(external) > 0 && len(internal) > 0 {
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ap.SubjectsRaw = external
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apCopy := *ap
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ap2 = &apCopy
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ap2.SubjectsRaw = internal
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ap2.IssuersRaw = []json.RawMessage{caddyconfig.JSONModuleObject(caddytls.InternalIssuer{}, "module", "internal", &warnings)}
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}
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}
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if tlsApp.Automation == nil {
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tlsApp.Automation = new(caddytls.AutomationConfig)
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}
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tlsApp.Automation.Policies = append(tlsApp.Automation.Policies, ap)
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if ap2 != nil {
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tlsApp.Automation.Policies = append(tlsApp.Automation.Policies, ap2)
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}
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// certificate loaders
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if clVals, ok := sblock.pile["tls.cert_loader"]; ok {
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for _, clVal := range clVals {
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certLoaders = append(certLoaders, clVal.Value.(caddytls.CertificateLoader))
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}
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}
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}
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}
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// group certificate loaders by module name, then add to config
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if len(certLoaders) > 0 {
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loadersByName := make(map[string]caddytls.CertificateLoader)
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for _, cl := range certLoaders {
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name := caddy.GetModuleName(cl)
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// ugh... technically, we may have multiple FileLoader and FolderLoader
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// modules (because the tls directive returns one per occurrence), but
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// the config structure expects only one instance of each kind of loader
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// module, so we have to combine them... instead of enumerating each
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// possible cert loader module in a type switch, we can use reflection,
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// which works on any cert loaders that are slice types
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if reflect.TypeOf(cl).Kind() == reflect.Slice {
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combined := reflect.ValueOf(loadersByName[name])
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if !combined.IsValid() {
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combined = reflect.New(reflect.TypeOf(cl)).Elem()
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}
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clVal := reflect.ValueOf(cl)
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for i := 0; i < clVal.Len(); i++ {
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combined = reflect.Append(combined, clVal.Index(i))
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}
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loadersByName[name] = combined.Interface().(caddytls.CertificateLoader)
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}
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}
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for certLoaderName, loaders := range loadersByName {
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tlsApp.CertificatesRaw[certLoaderName] = caddyconfig.JSON(loaders, &warnings)
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}
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}
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// set any of the on-demand options, for if/when on-demand TLS is enabled
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if onDemand, ok := options["on_demand_tls"].(*caddytls.OnDemandConfig); ok {
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if tlsApp.Automation == nil {
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tlsApp.Automation = new(caddytls.AutomationConfig)
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}
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tlsApp.Automation.OnDemand = onDemand
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}
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// if the storage clean interval is a boolean, then it's "off" to disable cleaning
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if sc, ok := options["storage_check"].(string); ok && sc == "off" {
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tlsApp.DisableStorageCheck = true
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}
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// if the storage clean interval is a boolean, then it's "off" to disable cleaning
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if sci, ok := options["storage_clean_interval"].(bool); ok && !sci {
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tlsApp.DisableStorageClean = true
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}
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// set the storage clean interval if configured
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if storageCleanInterval, ok := options["storage_clean_interval"].(caddy.Duration); ok {
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if tlsApp.Automation == nil {
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tlsApp.Automation = new(caddytls.AutomationConfig)
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}
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tlsApp.Automation.StorageCleanInterval = storageCleanInterval
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}
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// set the expired certificates renew interval if configured
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if renewCheckInterval, ok := options["renew_interval"].(caddy.Duration); ok {
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if tlsApp.Automation == nil {
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tlsApp.Automation = new(caddytls.AutomationConfig)
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}
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tlsApp.Automation.RenewCheckInterval = renewCheckInterval
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}
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// set the OCSP check interval if configured
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if ocspCheckInterval, ok := options["ocsp_interval"].(caddy.Duration); ok {
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if tlsApp.Automation == nil {
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tlsApp.Automation = new(caddytls.AutomationConfig)
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}
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tlsApp.Automation.OCSPCheckInterval = ocspCheckInterval
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}
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// set whether OCSP stapling should be disabled for manually-managed certificates
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if ocspConfig, ok := options["ocsp_stapling"].(certmagic.OCSPConfig); ok {
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tlsApp.DisableOCSPStapling = ocspConfig.DisableStapling
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}
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// if any hostnames appear on the same server block as a key with
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// no host, they will not be used with route matchers because the
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// hostless key matches all hosts, therefore, it wouldn't be
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// considered for auto-HTTPS, so we need to make sure those hosts
|
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// are manually considered for managed certificates; we also need
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// to make sure that any of these names which are internal-only
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// get internal certificates by default rather than ACME
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var al caddytls.AutomateLoader
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internalAP := &caddytls.AutomationPolicy{
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IssuersRaw: []json.RawMessage{json.RawMessage(`{"module":"internal"}`)},
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}
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if !slices.Contains(autoHTTPS, "off") && !slices.Contains(autoHTTPS, "disable_certs") {
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for h := range httpsHostsSharedWithHostlessKey {
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al = append(al, h)
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if !certmagic.SubjectQualifiesForPublicCert(h) {
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internalAP.SubjectsRaw = append(internalAP.SubjectsRaw, h)
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}
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}
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}
|
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if len(al) > 0 {
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tlsApp.CertificatesRaw["automate"] = caddyconfig.JSON(al, &warnings)
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}
|
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if len(internalAP.SubjectsRaw) > 0 {
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if tlsApp.Automation == nil {
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tlsApp.Automation = new(caddytls.AutomationConfig)
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}
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tlsApp.Automation.Policies = append(tlsApp.Automation.Policies, internalAP)
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}
|
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|
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// if there are any global options set for issuers (ACME ones in particular), make sure they
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// take effect in every automation policy that does not have any issuers
|
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if tlsApp.Automation != nil {
|
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globalEmail := options["email"]
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globalACMECA := options["acme_ca"]
|
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globalACMECARoot := options["acme_ca_root"]
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globalACMEDNS := options["acme_dns"]
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globalACMEEAB := options["acme_eab"]
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globalPreferredChains := options["preferred_chains"]
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hasGlobalACMEDefaults := globalEmail != nil || globalACMECA != nil || globalACMECARoot != nil || globalACMEDNS != nil || globalACMEEAB != nil || globalPreferredChains != nil
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if hasGlobalACMEDefaults {
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for i := 0; i < len(tlsApp.Automation.Policies); i++ {
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ap := tlsApp.Automation.Policies[i]
|
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if len(ap.Issuers) == 0 && automationPolicyHasAllPublicNames(ap) {
|
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// for public names, create default issuers which will later be filled in with configured global defaults
|
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// (internal names will implicitly use the internal issuer at auto-https time)
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emailStr, _ := globalEmail.(string)
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ap.Issuers = caddytls.DefaultIssuers(emailStr)
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// if a specific endpoint is configured, can't use multiple default issuers
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if globalACMECA != nil {
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ap.Issuers = []certmagic.Issuer{new(caddytls.ACMEIssuer)}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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|
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// finalize and verify policies; do cleanup
|
|
if tlsApp.Automation != nil {
|
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for i, ap := range tlsApp.Automation.Policies {
|
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// ensure all issuers have global defaults filled in
|
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for j, issuer := range ap.Issuers {
|
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err := fillInGlobalACMEDefaults(issuer, options)
|
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if err != nil {
|
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return nil, warnings, fmt.Errorf("filling in global issuer defaults for AP %d, issuer %d: %v", i, j, err)
|
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}
|
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}
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|
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// encode all issuer values we created, so they will be rendered in the output
|
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if len(ap.Issuers) > 0 && ap.IssuersRaw == nil {
|
|
for _, iss := range ap.Issuers {
|
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issuerName := iss.(caddy.Module).CaddyModule().ID.Name()
|
|
ap.IssuersRaw = append(ap.IssuersRaw, caddyconfig.JSONModuleObject(iss, "module", issuerName, &warnings))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// consolidate automation policies that are the exact same
|
|
tlsApp.Automation.Policies = consolidateAutomationPolicies(tlsApp.Automation.Policies)
|
|
|
|
// ensure automation policies don't overlap subjects (this should be
|
|
// an error at provision-time as well, but catch it in the adapt phase
|
|
// for convenience)
|
|
automationHostSet := make(map[string]struct{})
|
|
for _, ap := range tlsApp.Automation.Policies {
|
|
for _, s := range ap.SubjectsRaw {
|
|
if _, ok := automationHostSet[s]; ok {
|
|
return nil, warnings, fmt.Errorf("hostname appears in more than one automation policy, making certificate management ambiguous: %s", s)
|
|
}
|
|
automationHostSet[s] = struct{}{}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// if nothing remains, remove any excess values to clean up the resulting config
|
|
if len(tlsApp.Automation.Policies) == 0 {
|
|
tlsApp.Automation.Policies = nil
|
|
}
|
|
if reflect.DeepEqual(tlsApp.Automation, new(caddytls.AutomationConfig)) {
|
|
tlsApp.Automation = nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return tlsApp, warnings, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type acmeCapable interface{ GetACMEIssuer() *caddytls.ACMEIssuer }
|
|
|
|
func fillInGlobalACMEDefaults(issuer certmagic.Issuer, options map[string]any) error {
|
|
acmeWrapper, ok := issuer.(acmeCapable)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
acmeIssuer := acmeWrapper.GetACMEIssuer()
|
|
if acmeIssuer == nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
globalEmail := options["email"]
|
|
globalACMECA := options["acme_ca"]
|
|
globalACMECARoot := options["acme_ca_root"]
|
|
globalACMEDNS := options["acme_dns"]
|
|
globalACMEEAB := options["acme_eab"]
|
|
globalPreferredChains := options["preferred_chains"]
|
|
globalCertLifetime := options["cert_lifetime"]
|
|
globalHTTPPort, globalHTTPSPort := options["http_port"], options["https_port"]
|
|
|
|
if globalEmail != nil && acmeIssuer.Email == "" {
|
|
acmeIssuer.Email = globalEmail.(string)
|
|
}
|
|
if globalACMECA != nil && acmeIssuer.CA == "" {
|
|
acmeIssuer.CA = globalACMECA.(string)
|
|
}
|
|
if globalACMECARoot != nil && !slices.Contains(acmeIssuer.TrustedRootsPEMFiles, globalACMECARoot.(string)) {
|
|
acmeIssuer.TrustedRootsPEMFiles = append(acmeIssuer.TrustedRootsPEMFiles, globalACMECARoot.(string))
|
|
}
|
|
if globalACMEDNS != nil && (acmeIssuer.Challenges == nil || acmeIssuer.Challenges.DNS == nil) {
|
|
acmeIssuer.Challenges = &caddytls.ChallengesConfig{
|
|
DNS: &caddytls.DNSChallengeConfig{
|
|
ProviderRaw: caddyconfig.JSONModuleObject(globalACMEDNS, "name", globalACMEDNS.(caddy.Module).CaddyModule().ID.Name(), nil),
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if globalACMEEAB != nil && acmeIssuer.ExternalAccount == nil {
|
|
acmeIssuer.ExternalAccount = globalACMEEAB.(*acme.EAB)
|
|
}
|
|
if globalPreferredChains != nil && acmeIssuer.PreferredChains == nil {
|
|
acmeIssuer.PreferredChains = globalPreferredChains.(*caddytls.ChainPreference)
|
|
}
|
|
if globalHTTPPort != nil && (acmeIssuer.Challenges == nil || acmeIssuer.Challenges.HTTP == nil || acmeIssuer.Challenges.HTTP.AlternatePort == 0) {
|
|
if acmeIssuer.Challenges == nil {
|
|
acmeIssuer.Challenges = new(caddytls.ChallengesConfig)
|
|
}
|
|
if acmeIssuer.Challenges.HTTP == nil {
|
|
acmeIssuer.Challenges.HTTP = new(caddytls.HTTPChallengeConfig)
|
|
}
|
|
acmeIssuer.Challenges.HTTP.AlternatePort = globalHTTPPort.(int)
|
|
}
|
|
if globalHTTPSPort != nil && (acmeIssuer.Challenges == nil || acmeIssuer.Challenges.TLSALPN == nil || acmeIssuer.Challenges.TLSALPN.AlternatePort == 0) {
|
|
if acmeIssuer.Challenges == nil {
|
|
acmeIssuer.Challenges = new(caddytls.ChallengesConfig)
|
|
}
|
|
if acmeIssuer.Challenges.TLSALPN == nil {
|
|
acmeIssuer.Challenges.TLSALPN = new(caddytls.TLSALPNChallengeConfig)
|
|
}
|
|
acmeIssuer.Challenges.TLSALPN.AlternatePort = globalHTTPSPort.(int)
|
|
}
|
|
if globalCertLifetime != nil && acmeIssuer.CertificateLifetime == 0 {
|
|
acmeIssuer.CertificateLifetime = globalCertLifetime.(caddy.Duration)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// newBaseAutomationPolicy returns a new TLS automation policy that gets
|
|
// its values from the global options map. It should be used as the base
|
|
// for any other automation policies. A nil policy (and no error) will be
|
|
// returned if there are no default/global options. However, if always is
|
|
// true, a non-nil value will always be returned (unless there is an error).
|
|
func newBaseAutomationPolicy(
|
|
options map[string]any,
|
|
_ []caddyconfig.Warning,
|
|
always bool,
|
|
) (*caddytls.AutomationPolicy, error) {
|
|
issuers, hasIssuers := options["cert_issuer"]
|
|
_, hasLocalCerts := options["local_certs"]
|
|
keyType, hasKeyType := options["key_type"]
|
|
ocspStapling, hasOCSPStapling := options["ocsp_stapling"]
|
|
|
|
hasGlobalAutomationOpts := hasIssuers || hasLocalCerts || hasKeyType || hasOCSPStapling
|
|
|
|
// if there are no global options related to automation policies
|
|
// set, then we can just return right away
|
|
if !hasGlobalAutomationOpts {
|
|
if always {
|
|
return new(caddytls.AutomationPolicy), nil
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ap := new(caddytls.AutomationPolicy)
|
|
if hasKeyType {
|
|
ap.KeyType = keyType.(string)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if hasIssuers && hasLocalCerts {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("global options are ambiguous: local_certs is confusing when combined with cert_issuer, because local_certs is also a specific kind of issuer")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if hasIssuers {
|
|
ap.Issuers = issuers.([]certmagic.Issuer)
|
|
} else if hasLocalCerts {
|
|
ap.Issuers = []certmagic.Issuer{new(caddytls.InternalIssuer)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if hasOCSPStapling {
|
|
ocspConfig := ocspStapling.(certmagic.OCSPConfig)
|
|
ap.DisableOCSPStapling = ocspConfig.DisableStapling
|
|
ap.OCSPOverrides = ocspConfig.ResponderOverrides
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ap, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// consolidateAutomationPolicies combines automation policies that are the same,
|
|
// for a cleaner overall output.
|
|
func consolidateAutomationPolicies(aps []*caddytls.AutomationPolicy) []*caddytls.AutomationPolicy {
|
|
// sort from most specific to least specific; we depend on this ordering
|
|
sort.SliceStable(aps, func(i, j int) bool {
|
|
if automationPolicyIsSubset(aps[i], aps[j]) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
if automationPolicyIsSubset(aps[j], aps[i]) {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
return len(aps[i].SubjectsRaw) > len(aps[j].SubjectsRaw)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
emptyAPCount := 0
|
|
origLenAPs := len(aps)
|
|
// compute the number of empty policies (disregarding subjects) - see #4128
|
|
emptyAP := new(caddytls.AutomationPolicy)
|
|
for i := 0; i < len(aps); i++ {
|
|
emptyAP.SubjectsRaw = aps[i].SubjectsRaw
|
|
if reflect.DeepEqual(aps[i], emptyAP) {
|
|
emptyAPCount++
|
|
if !automationPolicyHasAllPublicNames(aps[i]) {
|
|
// if this automation policy has internal names, we might as well remove it
|
|
// so auto-https can implicitly use the internal issuer
|
|
aps = slices.Delete(aps, i, i+1)
|
|
i--
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// If all policies are empty, we can return nil, as there is no need to set any policy
|
|
if emptyAPCount == origLenAPs {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// remove or combine duplicate policies
|
|
outer:
|
|
for i := 0; i < len(aps); i++ {
|
|
// compare only with next policies; we sorted by specificity so we must not delete earlier policies
|
|
for j := i + 1; j < len(aps); j++ {
|
|
// if they're exactly equal in every way, just keep one of them
|
|
if reflect.DeepEqual(aps[i], aps[j]) {
|
|
aps = slices.Delete(aps, j, j+1)
|
|
// must re-evaluate current i against next j; can't skip it!
|
|
// even if i decrements to -1, will be incremented to 0 immediately
|
|
i--
|
|
continue outer
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// if the policy is the same, we can keep just one, but we have
|
|
// to be careful which one we keep; if only one has any hostnames
|
|
// defined, then we need to keep the one without any hostnames,
|
|
// otherwise the one without any subjects (a catch-all) would be
|
|
// eaten up by the one with subjects; and if both have subjects, we
|
|
// need to combine their lists
|
|
if reflect.DeepEqual(aps[i].IssuersRaw, aps[j].IssuersRaw) &&
|
|
reflect.DeepEqual(aps[i].ManagersRaw, aps[j].ManagersRaw) &&
|
|
bytes.Equal(aps[i].StorageRaw, aps[j].StorageRaw) &&
|
|
aps[i].MustStaple == aps[j].MustStaple &&
|
|
aps[i].KeyType == aps[j].KeyType &&
|
|
aps[i].OnDemand == aps[j].OnDemand &&
|
|
aps[i].ReusePrivateKeys == aps[j].ReusePrivateKeys &&
|
|
aps[i].RenewalWindowRatio == aps[j].RenewalWindowRatio {
|
|
if len(aps[i].SubjectsRaw) > 0 && len(aps[j].SubjectsRaw) == 0 {
|
|
// later policy (at j) has no subjects ("catch-all"), so we can
|
|
// remove the identical-but-more-specific policy that comes first
|
|
// AS LONG AS it is not shadowed by another policy before it; e.g.
|
|
// if policy i is for example.com, policy i+1 is '*.com', and policy
|
|
// j is catch-all, we cannot remove policy i because that would
|
|
// cause example.com to be served by the less specific policy for
|
|
// '*.com', which might be different (yes we've seen this happen)
|
|
if automationPolicyShadows(i, aps) >= j {
|
|
aps = slices.Delete(aps, i, i+1)
|
|
i--
|
|
continue outer
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
// avoid repeated subjects
|
|
for _, subj := range aps[j].SubjectsRaw {
|
|
if !slices.Contains(aps[i].SubjectsRaw, subj) {
|
|
aps[i].SubjectsRaw = append(aps[i].SubjectsRaw, subj)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
aps = slices.Delete(aps, j, j+1)
|
|
j--
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return aps
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// automationPolicyIsSubset returns true if a's subjects are a subset
|
|
// of b's subjects.
|
|
func automationPolicyIsSubset(a, b *caddytls.AutomationPolicy) bool {
|
|
if len(b.SubjectsRaw) == 0 {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
if len(a.SubjectsRaw) == 0 {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
for _, aSubj := range a.SubjectsRaw {
|
|
inSuperset := slices.ContainsFunc(b.SubjectsRaw, func(bSubj string) bool {
|
|
return certmagic.MatchWildcard(aSubj, bSubj)
|
|
})
|
|
if !inSuperset {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// automationPolicyShadows returns the index of a policy that aps[i] shadows;
|
|
// in other words, for all policies after position i, if that policy covers
|
|
// the same subjects but is less specific, that policy's position is returned,
|
|
// or -1 if no shadowing is found. For example, if policy i is for
|
|
// "foo.example.com" and policy i+2 is for "*.example.com", then i+2 will be
|
|
// returned, since that policy is shadowed by i, which is in front.
|
|
func automationPolicyShadows(i int, aps []*caddytls.AutomationPolicy) int {
|
|
for j := i + 1; j < len(aps); j++ {
|
|
if automationPolicyIsSubset(aps[i], aps[j]) {
|
|
return j
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return -1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// subjectQualifiesForPublicCert is like certmagic.SubjectQualifiesForPublicCert() except
|
|
// that this allows domains with multiple wildcard levels like '*.*.example.com' to qualify
|
|
// if the automation policy has OnDemand enabled (i.e. this function is more lenient).
|
|
//
|
|
// IP subjects are considered as non-qualifying for public certs. Technically, there are
|
|
// now public ACME CAs as well as non-ACME CAs that issue IP certificates. But this function
|
|
// is used solely for implicit automation (defaults), where it gets really complicated to
|
|
// keep track of which issuers support IP certificates in which circumstances. Currently,
|
|
// issuers that support IP certificates are very few, and all require some sort of config
|
|
// from the user anyway (such as an account credential). Since we cannot implicitly and
|
|
// automatically get public IP certs without configuration from the user, we treat IPs as
|
|
// not qualifying for public certificates. Users should expressly configure an issuer
|
|
// that supports IP certs for that purpose.
|
|
func subjectQualifiesForPublicCert(ap *caddytls.AutomationPolicy, subj string) bool {
|
|
return !certmagic.SubjectIsIP(subj) &&
|
|
!certmagic.SubjectIsInternal(subj) &&
|
|
(strings.Count(subj, "*.") < 2 || ap.OnDemand)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// automationPolicyHasAllPublicNames returns true if all the names on the policy
|
|
// do NOT qualify for public certs OR are tailscale domains.
|
|
func automationPolicyHasAllPublicNames(ap *caddytls.AutomationPolicy) bool {
|
|
return !slices.ContainsFunc(ap.SubjectsRaw, func(i string) bool {
|
|
return !subjectQualifiesForPublicCert(ap, i) || isTailscaleDomain(i)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func isTailscaleDomain(name string) bool {
|
|
return strings.HasSuffix(strings.ToLower(name), ".ts.net")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func hostsCoveredByWildcard(hosts []string, wildcards []string) bool {
|
|
if len(hosts) == 0 || len(wildcards) == 0 {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
for _, host := range hosts {
|
|
for _, wildcard := range wildcards {
|
|
if strings.HasPrefix(host, "*.") {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if certmagic.MatchWildcard(host, "*."+wildcard) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|