The previous setting caused the service to hit a rate-limit when it was
restarted more than 5 times in 24h.
Editing the Caddyfile and restarting the service could also easily
trigger this rate limit.
One could argue that users could simply call `systemctl reset-failed
caddy` to reset the rate-limit counter, but this is counterintuitive
because most users won't know this command and are possibly unaware that
they had hit a rate-limit.
The service is now allowed to restart 10 times in 10 seconds before
hitting a rate limit.
This should be conservative enough to rate limit quickly failing
services and to allow users to edit and test their caddy configuration.
This closes#1718
Remove restart limit settings and use defaults
By default 5 restarts within 10 seconds are allowed without
encountering a restart limit hit, see `man systemd.unit` for details.
Set Restart to on-abnormal
The table in https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/systemd.service.html#Restart=
shows the conditions for which on-abnormal would restart the service.
It will *not* restart the service in the following cases:
- a non-zero exit status, e.g. an invalid Caddyfile
- a zero exit code (or those specified in SuccessExitStatus=) and a clean signal
clean signals are SIGHUP, SIGINT, SIGTERM or SIGPIPE
3536f49e8f/src/basic/exit-status.c (L205)
The service *will be restarted* in the following cases:
- a unclean signal, e.g. SIGKILL
- on start and watchdog timeout (we don't use those systemd service
constructs explicitly)
* SIGUSR2 triggers graceful binary upgrades (spawns new process)
* Move some functions around, hopefully fixing Windows build
* Clean up a couple file closes and add links to useful debugging thread
* Use two underscores in upgrade env var
To help ensure uniqueness / avoid possible collisions
https://caddy.community/t/random-ocsp-response-errors-for-random-clients/2473?u=matt
Certificates are keyed by name in the cache, optimized for fast lookups
during TLS handshakes using SNI. A more "correct" way that is truly a
1:1 would be to cache certificates by a hash of the leaf's DER bytes,
but this involves an extra index to maintain. So instead of that, we
simply choose to prevent overlap when keying certificates by server
name. This avoids the ambiguity when updating OCSP staples, for instance.
Updated ifCondition test to deep test all fields.
Changed NewComplexRule to not return a pointer.
Corrected panic detection in formatting.
Fixed failing test cases.
Fixed review bug for test.
Fixes bug caused by Replacer running on the regular expressions in IfMatcher. We also now compile regular expressions up front to detect errors.
Fixes rewrite bugs that come from formatting a rule as a string and failing with nil dereference caused by embedding Regexp pointer in a Rule. Re: Issue #1794
0: normal or expected exit
1: error before server finished starting
2: double SIGINT (force quit)
3: error stopping with SIGQUIT
4: shutdown callback(s) returned error(s)
Use httpserver.IndexFile() to determine index files
Test if middleware pushes indexfile when requesting directory
Fix codereview issues
Serve original request first, push later
Revert "Serve original request first, push later"
This reverts commit 2c66f01115747e5665ba7f2d33e2fd551dc31877.
According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7232#section-2.1
> Likewise, a validator is weak if it is shared by two or more
representations of a given resource at the same time, unless those
representations have identical representation data. For example, if
the origin server sends the same validator for a representation with
a gzip content coding applied as it does for a representation with no
content coding, then that validator is weak.
Therefore, after gzip, we should change the original etag to weak etag.
