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// Copyright 2015 Matthew Holt and The Caddy Authors
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
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package caddyhttp
import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strconv"
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"strings"
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"github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2"
"github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddytls"
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"github.com/caddyserver/certmagic"
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"go.uber.org/zap"
)
// AutoHTTPSConfig is used to disable automatic HTTPS
// or certain aspects of it for a specific server.
// HTTPS is enabled automatically and by default when
// qualifying hostnames are available from the config.
type AutoHTTPSConfig struct {
// If true, automatic HTTPS will be entirely disabled.
Disabled bool ` json:"disable,omitempty" `
// If true, only automatic HTTP->HTTPS redirects will
// be disabled.
DisableRedir bool ` json:"disable_redirects,omitempty" `
// Hosts/domain names listed here will not be included
// in automatic HTTPS (they will not have certificates
// loaded nor redirects applied).
Skip [ ] string ` json:"skip,omitempty" `
// Hosts/domain names listed here will still be enabled
// for automatic HTTPS (unless in the Skip list), except
// that certificates will not be provisioned and managed
// for these names.
SkipCerts [ ] string ` json:"skip_certificates,omitempty" `
// By default, automatic HTTPS will obtain and renew
// certificates for qualifying hostnames. However, if
// a certificate with a matching SAN is already loaded
// into the cache, certificate management will not be
// enabled. To force automated certificate management
// regardless of loaded certificates, set this to true.
IgnoreLoadedCerts bool ` json:"ignore_loaded_certificates,omitempty" `
}
// Skipped returns true if name is in skipSlice, which
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// should be either the Skip or SkipCerts field on ahc.
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func ( ahc AutoHTTPSConfig ) Skipped ( name string , skipSlice [ ] string ) bool {
for _ , n := range skipSlice {
if name == n {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// automaticHTTPSPhase1 provisions all route matchers, determines
// which domain names found in the routes qualify for automatic
// HTTPS, and sets up HTTP->HTTPS redirects. This phase must occur
// at the beginning of provisioning, because it may add routes and
// even servers to the app, which still need to be set up with the
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// rest of them during provisioning.
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func ( app * App ) automaticHTTPSPhase1 ( ctx caddy . Context , repl * caddy . Replacer ) error {
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// this map acts as a set to store the domain names
// for which we will manage certificates automatically
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uniqueDomainsForCerts := make ( map [ string ] struct { } )
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// this maps domain names for automatic HTTP->HTTPS
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// redirects to their destination server addresses
// (there might be more than 1 if bind is used; see
// https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy/issues/3443)
redirDomains := make ( map [ string ] [ ] caddy . NetworkAddress )
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for srvName , srv := range app . Servers {
// as a prerequisite, provision route matchers; this is
// required for all routes on all servers, and must be
// done before we attempt to do phase 1 of auto HTTPS,
// since we have to access the decoded host matchers the
// handlers will be provisioned later
if srv . Routes != nil {
err := srv . Routes . ProvisionMatchers ( ctx )
if err != nil {
return fmt . Errorf ( "server %s: setting up route matchers: %v" , srvName , err )
}
}
// prepare for automatic HTTPS
if srv . AutoHTTPS == nil {
srv . AutoHTTPS = new ( AutoHTTPSConfig )
}
if srv . AutoHTTPS . Disabled {
continue
}
// skip if all listeners use the HTTP port
if ! srv . listenersUseAnyPortOtherThan ( app . httpPort ( ) ) {
app . logger . Info ( "server is listening only on the HTTP port, so no automatic HTTPS will be applied to this server" ,
zap . String ( "server_name" , srvName ) ,
zap . Int ( "http_port" , app . httpPort ( ) ) ,
)
srv . AutoHTTPS . Disabled = true
continue
}
// if all listeners are on the HTTPS port, make sure
// there is at least one TLS connection policy; it
// should be obvious that they want to use TLS without
// needing to specify one empty policy to enable it
if srv . TLSConnPolicies == nil &&
! srv . listenersUseAnyPortOtherThan ( app . httpsPort ( ) ) {
app . logger . Info ( "server is listening only on the HTTPS port but has no TLS connection policies; adding one to enable TLS" ,
zap . String ( "server_name" , srvName ) ,
zap . Int ( "https_port" , app . httpsPort ( ) ) ,
)
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srv . TLSConnPolicies = caddytls . ConnectionPolicies { new ( caddytls . ConnectionPolicy ) }
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}
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// find all qualifying domain names (deduplicated) in this server
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// (this is where we need the provisioned, decoded request matchers)
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serverDomainSet := make ( map [ string ] struct { } )
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for routeIdx , route := range srv . Routes {
for matcherSetIdx , matcherSet := range route . MatcherSets {
for matcherIdx , m := range matcherSet {
if hm , ok := m . ( * MatchHost ) ; ok {
for hostMatcherIdx , d := range * hm {
var err error
d , err = repl . ReplaceOrErr ( d , true , false )
if err != nil {
return fmt . Errorf ( "%s: route %d, matcher set %d, matcher %d, host matcher %d: %v" ,
srvName , routeIdx , matcherSetIdx , matcherIdx , hostMatcherIdx , err )
}
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if ! srv . AutoHTTPS . Skipped ( d , srv . AutoHTTPS . Skip ) {
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serverDomainSet [ d ] = struct { } { }
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}
}
}
}
}
}
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// nothing more to do here if there are no domains that qualify for
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// automatic HTTPS and there are no explicit TLS connection policies:
// if there is at least one domain but no TLS conn policy (F&&T), we'll
// add one below; if there are no domains but at least one TLS conn
// policy (meaning TLS is enabled) (T&&F), it could be a catch-all with
// on-demand TLS -- and in that case we would still need HTTP->HTTPS
// redirects, which we set up below; hence these two conditions
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if len ( serverDomainSet ) == 0 && len ( srv . TLSConnPolicies ) == 0 {
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continue
}
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// for all the hostnames we found, filter them so we have
// a deduplicated list of names for which to obtain certs
for d := range serverDomainSet {
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if certmagic . SubjectQualifiesForCert ( d ) &&
! srv . AutoHTTPS . Skipped ( d , srv . AutoHTTPS . SkipCerts ) {
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// if a certificate for this name is already loaded,
// don't obtain another one for it, unless we are
// supposed to ignore loaded certificates
if ! srv . AutoHTTPS . IgnoreLoadedCerts &&
len ( app . tlsApp . AllMatchingCertificates ( d ) ) > 0 {
app . logger . Info ( "skipping automatic certificate management because one or more matching certificates are already loaded" ,
zap . String ( "domain" , d ) ,
zap . String ( "server_name" , srvName ) ,
)
continue
}
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// most clients don't accept wildcards like *.tld... we
// can handle that, but as a courtesy, warn the user
if strings . Contains ( d , "*" ) &&
strings . Count ( strings . Trim ( d , "." ) , "." ) == 1 {
app . logger . Warn ( "most clients do not trust second-level wildcard certificates (*.tld)" ,
zap . String ( "domain" , d ) )
}
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uniqueDomainsForCerts [ d ] = struct { } { }
}
}
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// tell the server to use TLS if it is not already doing so
if srv . TLSConnPolicies == nil {
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srv . TLSConnPolicies = caddytls . ConnectionPolicies { new ( caddytls . ConnectionPolicy ) }
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}
// nothing left to do if auto redirects are disabled
if srv . AutoHTTPS . DisableRedir {
continue
}
app . logger . Info ( "enabling automatic HTTP->HTTPS redirects" ,
zap . String ( "server_name" , srvName ) ,
)
// create HTTP->HTTPS redirects
for _ , addr := range srv . Listen {
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// figure out the address we will redirect to...
addr , err := caddy . ParseNetworkAddress ( addr )
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if err != nil {
return fmt . Errorf ( "%s: invalid listener address: %v" , srvName , addr )
}
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// this address might not have a hostname, i.e. might be a
// catch-all address for a particular port; we need to keep
// track if it is, so we can set up redirects for it anyway
// (e.g. the user might have enabled on-demand TLS); we use
// an empty string to indicate a catch-all, which we have to
// treat special later
if len ( serverDomainSet ) == 0 {
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redirDomains [ "" ] = append ( redirDomains [ "" ] , addr )
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continue
}
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// ...and associate it with each domain in this server
for d := range serverDomainSet {
// if this domain is used on more than one HTTPS-enabled
// port, we'll have to choose one, so prefer the HTTPS port
if _ , ok := redirDomains [ d ] ; ! ok ||
addr . StartPort == uint ( app . httpsPort ( ) ) {
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redirDomains [ d ] = append ( redirDomains [ d ] , addr )
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}
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}
}
}
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// we now have a list of all the unique names for which we need certs;
// turn the set into a slice so that phase 2 can use it
app . allCertDomains = make ( [ ] string , 0 , len ( uniqueDomainsForCerts ) )
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var internal , external [ ] string
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uniqueDomainsLoop :
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for d := range uniqueDomainsForCerts {
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// whether or not there is already an automation policy for this
// name, we should add it to the list to manage a cert for it
app . allCertDomains = append ( app . allCertDomains , d )
// some names we've found might already have automation policies
// explicitly specified for them; we should exclude those from
// our hidden/implicit policy, since applying a name to more than
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// one automation policy would be confusing and an error
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if app . tlsApp . Automation != nil {
for _ , ap := range app . tlsApp . Automation . Policies {
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for _ , apHost := range ap . Subjects {
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if apHost == d {
continue uniqueDomainsLoop
}
}
}
}
// if no automation policy exists for the name yet, we
// will associate it with an implicit one
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if certmagic . SubjectQualifiesForPublicCert ( d ) {
external = append ( external , d )
} else {
internal = append ( internal , d )
}
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}
// ensure there is an automation policy to handle these certs
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err := app . createAutomationPolicies ( ctx , external , internal )
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if err != nil {
return err
}
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// we need to reduce the mapping, i.e. group domains by address
// since new routes are appended to servers by their address
domainsByAddr := make ( map [ string ] [ ] string )
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for domain , addrs := range redirDomains {
for _ , addr := range addrs {
addrStr := addr . String ( )
domainsByAddr [ addrStr ] = append ( domainsByAddr [ addrStr ] , domain )
}
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}
// these keep track of the redirect server address(es)
// and the routes for those servers which actually
// respond with the redirects
redirServerAddrs := make ( map [ string ] struct { } )
redirServers := make ( map [ string ] [ ] Route )
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var redirRoutes RouteList
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for addrStr , domains := range domainsByAddr {
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// build the matcher set for this redirect route; (note that we happen
// to bypass Provision and Validate steps for these matcher modules)
matcherSet := MatcherSet { MatchProtocol ( "http" ) }
// match on known domain names, unless it's our special case of a
// catch-all which is an empty string (common among catch-all sites
// that enable on-demand TLS for yet-unknown domain names)
if ! ( len ( domains ) == 1 && domains [ 0 ] == "" ) {
matcherSet = append ( matcherSet , MatchHost ( domains ) )
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}
// build the address to which to redirect
addr , err := caddy . ParseNetworkAddress ( addrStr )
if err != nil {
return err
}
redirTo := "https://{http.request.host}"
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if addr . StartPort != uint ( app . httpsPort ( ) ) {
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redirTo += ":" + strconv . Itoa ( int ( addr . StartPort ) )
}
redirTo += "{http.request.uri}"
// build the route
redirRoute := Route {
MatcherSets : [ ] MatcherSet { matcherSet } ,
Handlers : [ ] MiddlewareHandler {
StaticResponse {
StatusCode : WeakString ( strconv . Itoa ( http . StatusPermanentRedirect ) ) ,
Headers : http . Header {
"Location" : [ ] string { redirTo } ,
"Connection" : [ ] string { "close" } ,
} ,
Close : true ,
} ,
} ,
}
// use the network/host information from the address,
// but change the port to the HTTP port then rebuild
redirAddr := addr
redirAddr . StartPort = uint ( app . httpPort ( ) )
redirAddr . EndPort = redirAddr . StartPort
redirAddrStr := redirAddr . String ( )
redirServers [ redirAddrStr ] = append ( redirServers [ redirAddrStr ] , redirRoute )
}
// on-demand TLS means that hostnames may be used which are not
// explicitly defined in the config, and we still need to redirect
// those; so we can append a single catch-all route (notice there
// is no Host matcher) after the other redirect routes which will
// allow us to handle unexpected/new hostnames... however, it's
// not entirely clear what the redirect destination should be,
// so I'm going to just hard-code the app's HTTPS port and call
// it good for now...
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// TODO: This implies that all plaintext requests will be blindly
// redirected to their HTTPS equivalent, even if this server
// doesn't handle that hostname at all; I don't think this is a
// bad thing, and it also obscures the actual hostnames that this
// server is configured to match on, which may be desirable, but
// it's not something that should be relied on. We can change this
// if we want to.
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appendCatchAll := func ( routes [ ] Route ) [ ] Route {
redirTo := "https://{http.request.host}"
if app . httpsPort ( ) != DefaultHTTPSPort {
redirTo += ":" + strconv . Itoa ( app . httpsPort ( ) )
}
redirTo += "{http.request.uri}"
routes = append ( routes , Route {
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MatcherSets : [ ] MatcherSet { { MatchProtocol ( "http" ) } } ,
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Handlers : [ ] MiddlewareHandler {
StaticResponse {
StatusCode : WeakString ( strconv . Itoa ( http . StatusPermanentRedirect ) ) ,
Headers : http . Header {
"Location" : [ ] string { redirTo } ,
"Connection" : [ ] string { "close" } ,
} ,
Close : true ,
} ,
} ,
} )
return routes
}
redirServersLoop :
for redirServerAddr , routes := range redirServers {
// for each redirect listener, see if there's already a
// server configured to listen on that exact address; if so,
// simply add the redirect route to the end of its route
// list; otherwise, we'll create a new server for all the
// listener addresses that are unused and serve the
// remaining redirects from it
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for srvName , srv := range app . Servers {
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if srv . hasListenerAddress ( redirServerAddr ) {
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// user has configured a server for the same address
// that the redirect runs from; simply append our
// redirect route to the existing routes, with a
// caveat that their config might override ours
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app . logger . Warn ( "user server is listening on same interface as automatic HTTP->HTTPS redirects; user-configured routes might override these redirects" ,
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zap . String ( "server_name" , srvName ) ,
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zap . String ( "interface" , redirServerAddr ) ,
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)
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srv . Routes = append ( srv . Routes , appendCatchAll ( routes ) ... )
continue redirServersLoop
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}
}
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// no server with this listener address exists;
// save this address and route for custom server
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redirServerAddrs [ redirServerAddr ] = struct { } { }
redirRoutes = append ( redirRoutes , routes ... )
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}
// if there are routes remaining which do not belong
// in any existing server, make our own to serve the
// rest of the redirects
if len ( redirServerAddrs ) > 0 {
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redirServerAddrsList := make ( [ ] string , 0 , len ( redirServerAddrs ) )
for a := range redirServerAddrs {
redirServerAddrsList = append ( redirServerAddrsList , a )
}
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app . Servers [ "remaining_auto_https_redirects" ] = & Server {
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Listen : redirServerAddrsList ,
Routes : appendCatchAll ( redirRoutes ) ,
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}
}
return nil
}
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// createAutomationPolicy ensures that automated certificates for this
// app are managed properly. This adds up to two automation policies:
// one for the public names, and one for the internal names. If a catch-all
// automation policy exists, it will be shallow-copied and used as the
// base for the new ones (this is important for preserving behavior the
// user intends to be "defaults").
func ( app * App ) createAutomationPolicies ( ctx caddy . Context , publicNames , internalNames [ ] string ) error {
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// before we begin, loop through the existing automation policies
// and, for any ACMEIssuers we find, make sure they're filled in
// with default values that might be specified in our HTTP app; also
// look for a base (or "catch-all" / default) automation policy,
// which we're going to essentially require, to make sure it has
// those defaults, too
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var basePolicy * caddytls . AutomationPolicy
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var foundBasePolicy bool
if app . tlsApp . Automation == nil {
// we will expect this to not be nil from now on
app . tlsApp . Automation = new ( caddytls . AutomationConfig )
}
for _ , ap := range app . tlsApp . Automation . Policies {
// set up default issuer -- honestly, this is only
// really necessary because the HTTP app is opinionated
// and has settings which could be inferred as new
// defaults for the ACMEIssuer in the TLS app
if ap . Issuer == nil {
ap . Issuer = new ( caddytls . ACMEIssuer )
}
caddytls: Add support for ZeroSSL; add Caddyfile support for issuers (#3633)
* caddytls: Add support for ZeroSSL; add Caddyfile support for issuers
Configuring issuers explicitly in a Caddyfile is not easily compatible
with existing ACME-specific parameters such as email or acme_ca which
infer the kind of issuer it creates (this is complicated now because
the ZeroSSL issuer wraps the ACME issuer)... oh well, we can revisit
that later if we need to.
New Caddyfile global option:
{
cert_issuer <name> ...
}
Or, alternatively, as a tls subdirective:
tls {
issuer <name> ...
}
For example, to use ZeroSSL with an API key:
{
cert_issuser zerossl API_KEY
}
For now, that still uses ZeroSSL's ACME endpoint; it fetches EAB
credentials for you. You can also provide the EAB credentials directly
just like any other ACME endpoint:
{
cert_issuer acme {
eab KEY_ID MAC_KEY
}
}
All these examples use the new global option (or tls subdirective). You
can still use traditional/existing options with ZeroSSL, since it's
just another ACME endpoint:
{
acme_ca https://acme.zerossl.com/v2/DV90
acme_eab KEY_ID MAC_KEY
}
That's all there is to it. You just can't mix-and-match acme_* options
with cert_issuer, because it becomes confusing/ambiguous/complicated to
merge the settings.
* Fix broken test
This test was asserting buggy behavior, oops - glad this branch both
discovers and fixes the bug at the same time!
* Fix broken test (post-merge)
* Update modules/caddytls/acmeissuer.go
Fix godoc comment
Co-authored-by: Francis Lavoie <lavofr@gmail.com>
* Add support for ZeroSSL's EAB-by-email endpoint
Also transform the ACMEIssuer into ZeroSSLIssuer implicitly if set to
the ZeroSSL endpoint without EAB (the ZeroSSLIssuer is needed to
generate EAB if not already provided); this is now possible with either
an API key or an email address.
* go.mod: Use latest certmagic, acmez, and x/net
* Wrap underlying logic rather than repeating it
Oops, duh
* Form-encode email info into request body for EAB endpoint
Co-authored-by: Francis Lavoie <lavofr@gmail.com>
2020-08-11 09:58:06 -05:00
if acmeIssuer , ok := ap . Issuer . ( acmeCapable ) ; ok {
err := app . fillInACMEIssuer ( acmeIssuer . GetACMEIssuer ( ) )
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if err != nil {
return err
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}
}
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// while we're here, is this the catch-all/base policy?
if ! foundBasePolicy && len ( ap . Subjects ) == 0 {
basePolicy = ap
foundBasePolicy = true
}
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}
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if basePolicy == nil {
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// no base policy found, we will make one!
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basePolicy = new ( caddytls . AutomationPolicy )
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}
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caddytls: Add support for ZeroSSL; add Caddyfile support for issuers (#3633)
* caddytls: Add support for ZeroSSL; add Caddyfile support for issuers
Configuring issuers explicitly in a Caddyfile is not easily compatible
with existing ACME-specific parameters such as email or acme_ca which
infer the kind of issuer it creates (this is complicated now because
the ZeroSSL issuer wraps the ACME issuer)... oh well, we can revisit
that later if we need to.
New Caddyfile global option:
{
cert_issuer <name> ...
}
Or, alternatively, as a tls subdirective:
tls {
issuer <name> ...
}
For example, to use ZeroSSL with an API key:
{
cert_issuser zerossl API_KEY
}
For now, that still uses ZeroSSL's ACME endpoint; it fetches EAB
credentials for you. You can also provide the EAB credentials directly
just like any other ACME endpoint:
{
cert_issuer acme {
eab KEY_ID MAC_KEY
}
}
All these examples use the new global option (or tls subdirective). You
can still use traditional/existing options with ZeroSSL, since it's
just another ACME endpoint:
{
acme_ca https://acme.zerossl.com/v2/DV90
acme_eab KEY_ID MAC_KEY
}
That's all there is to it. You just can't mix-and-match acme_* options
with cert_issuer, because it becomes confusing/ambiguous/complicated to
merge the settings.
* Fix broken test
This test was asserting buggy behavior, oops - glad this branch both
discovers and fixes the bug at the same time!
* Fix broken test (post-merge)
* Update modules/caddytls/acmeissuer.go
Fix godoc comment
Co-authored-by: Francis Lavoie <lavofr@gmail.com>
* Add support for ZeroSSL's EAB-by-email endpoint
Also transform the ACMEIssuer into ZeroSSLIssuer implicitly if set to
the ZeroSSL endpoint without EAB (the ZeroSSLIssuer is needed to
generate EAB if not already provided); this is now possible with either
an API key or an email address.
* go.mod: Use latest certmagic, acmez, and x/net
* Wrap underlying logic rather than repeating it
Oops, duh
* Form-encode email info into request body for EAB endpoint
Co-authored-by: Francis Lavoie <lavofr@gmail.com>
2020-08-11 09:58:06 -05:00
// if the basePolicy has an existing ACMEIssuer (particularly to
// include any type that embeds/wraps an ACMEIssuer), let's use it,
// otherwise we'll make one
var baseACMEIssuer * caddytls . ACMEIssuer
if acmeWrapper , ok := basePolicy . Issuer . ( acmeCapable ) ; ok {
baseACMEIssuer = acmeWrapper . GetACMEIssuer ( )
}
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if baseACMEIssuer == nil {
// note that this happens if basePolicy.Issuer is nil
// OR if it is not nil but is not an ACMEIssuer
baseACMEIssuer = new ( caddytls . ACMEIssuer )
}
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// if there was a base policy to begin with, we already
// filled in its issuer's defaults; if there wasn't, we
// stil need to do that
if ! foundBasePolicy {
err := app . fillInACMEIssuer ( baseACMEIssuer )
if err != nil {
return err
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}
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}
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// never overwrite any other issuer that might already be configured
if basePolicy . Issuer == nil {
basePolicy . Issuer = baseACMEIssuer
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}
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if ! foundBasePolicy {
// there was no base policy to begin with, so add
// our base/catch-all policy - this will serve the
// public-looking names as well as any other names
// that don't match any other policy
app . tlsApp . AddAutomationPolicy ( basePolicy )
} else {
// a base policy already existed; we might have
// changed it, so re-provision it
err := basePolicy . Provision ( app . tlsApp )
if err != nil {
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return err
}
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}
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// public names will be taken care of by the base (catch-all)
// policy, which we've ensured exists if not already specified;
// internal names, however, need to be handled by an internal
// issuer, which we need to make a new policy for, scoped to
// just those names (yes, this logic is a bit asymmetric, but
// it works, because our assumed/natural default issuer is an
// ACME issuer)
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if len ( internalNames ) > 0 {
internalIssuer := new ( caddytls . InternalIssuer )
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// shallow-copy the base policy; we want to inherit
// from it, not replace it... this takes two lines to
// overrule compiler optimizations
policyCopy := * basePolicy
newPolicy := & policyCopy
// very important to provision the issuer, since we
// are bypassing the JSON-unmarshaling step
if err := internalIssuer . Provision ( ctx ) ; err != nil {
return err
}
// this policy should apply only to the given names
// and should use our issuer -- yes, this overrides
// any issuer that may have been set in the base
// policy, but we do this because these names do not
// already have a policy associated with them, which
// is easy to do; consider the case of a Caddyfile
// that has only "localhost" as a name, but sets the
// default/global ACME CA to the Let's Encrypt staging
// endpoint... they probably don't intend to change the
// fundamental set of names that setting applies to,
// rather they just want to change the CA for the set
// of names that would normally use the production API;
// anyway, that gets into the weeds a bit...
newPolicy . Subjects = internalNames
newPolicy . Issuer = internalIssuer
err := app . tlsApp . AddAutomationPolicy ( newPolicy )
if err != nil {
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return err
}
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}
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// we just changed a lot of stuff, so double-check that it's all good
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err := app . tlsApp . Validate ( )
if err != nil {
return err
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}
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return nil
}
// fillInACMEIssuer fills in default values into acmeIssuer that
// are defined in app; these values at time of writing are just
// app.HTTPPort and app.HTTPSPort, which are used by ACMEIssuer.
// Sure, we could just use the global/CertMagic defaults, but if
// a user has configured those ports in the HTTP app, it makes
// sense to use them in the TLS app too, even if they forgot (or
// were too lazy, like me) to set it in each automation policy
// that uses it -- this just makes things a little less tedious
// for the user, so they don't have to repeat those ports in
// potentially many places. This function never steps on existing
// config values. If any changes are made, acmeIssuer is
// reprovisioned. acmeIssuer must not be nil.
func ( app * App ) fillInACMEIssuer ( acmeIssuer * caddytls . ACMEIssuer ) error {
if app . HTTPPort > 0 || app . HTTPSPort > 0 {
if acmeIssuer . Challenges == nil {
acmeIssuer . Challenges = new ( caddytls . ChallengesConfig )
}
}
if app . HTTPPort > 0 {
if acmeIssuer . Challenges . HTTP == nil {
acmeIssuer . Challenges . HTTP = new ( caddytls . HTTPChallengeConfig )
}
// don't overwrite existing explicit config
if acmeIssuer . Challenges . HTTP . AlternatePort == 0 {
acmeIssuer . Challenges . HTTP . AlternatePort = app . HTTPPort
}
}
if app . HTTPSPort > 0 {
if acmeIssuer . Challenges . TLSALPN == nil {
acmeIssuer . Challenges . TLSALPN = new ( caddytls . TLSALPNChallengeConfig )
}
// don't overwrite existing explicit config
if acmeIssuer . Challenges . TLSALPN . AlternatePort == 0 {
acmeIssuer . Challenges . TLSALPN . AlternatePort = app . HTTPSPort
}
}
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// we must provision all ACME issuers, even if nothing
// was changed, because we don't know if they are new
// and haven't been provisioned yet; if an ACME issuer
// never gets provisioned, its Agree field stays false,
// which leads to, um, problems later on
return acmeIssuer . Provision ( app . ctx )
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}
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// automaticHTTPSPhase2 begins certificate management for
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// all names in the qualifying domain set for each server.
// This phase must occur after provisioning and at the end
// of app start, after all the servers have been started.
// Doing this last ensures that there won't be any race
// for listeners on the HTTP or HTTPS ports when management
// is async (if CertMagic's solvers bind to those ports
// first, then our servers would fail to bind to them,
// which would be bad, since CertMagic's bindings are
// temporary and don't serve the user's sites!).
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func ( app * App ) automaticHTTPSPhase2 ( ) error {
if len ( app . allCertDomains ) == 0 {
return nil
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}
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app . logger . Info ( "enabling automatic TLS certificate management" ,
zap . Strings ( "domains" , app . allCertDomains ) ,
)
err := app . tlsApp . Manage ( app . allCertDomains )
if err != nil {
return fmt . Errorf ( "managing certificates for %v: %s" , app . allCertDomains , err )
}
app . allCertDomains = nil // no longer needed; allow GC to deallocate
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return nil
}
caddytls: Add support for ZeroSSL; add Caddyfile support for issuers (#3633)
* caddytls: Add support for ZeroSSL; add Caddyfile support for issuers
Configuring issuers explicitly in a Caddyfile is not easily compatible
with existing ACME-specific parameters such as email or acme_ca which
infer the kind of issuer it creates (this is complicated now because
the ZeroSSL issuer wraps the ACME issuer)... oh well, we can revisit
that later if we need to.
New Caddyfile global option:
{
cert_issuer <name> ...
}
Or, alternatively, as a tls subdirective:
tls {
issuer <name> ...
}
For example, to use ZeroSSL with an API key:
{
cert_issuser zerossl API_KEY
}
For now, that still uses ZeroSSL's ACME endpoint; it fetches EAB
credentials for you. You can also provide the EAB credentials directly
just like any other ACME endpoint:
{
cert_issuer acme {
eab KEY_ID MAC_KEY
}
}
All these examples use the new global option (or tls subdirective). You
can still use traditional/existing options with ZeroSSL, since it's
just another ACME endpoint:
{
acme_ca https://acme.zerossl.com/v2/DV90
acme_eab KEY_ID MAC_KEY
}
That's all there is to it. You just can't mix-and-match acme_* options
with cert_issuer, because it becomes confusing/ambiguous/complicated to
merge the settings.
* Fix broken test
This test was asserting buggy behavior, oops - glad this branch both
discovers and fixes the bug at the same time!
* Fix broken test (post-merge)
* Update modules/caddytls/acmeissuer.go
Fix godoc comment
Co-authored-by: Francis Lavoie <lavofr@gmail.com>
* Add support for ZeroSSL's EAB-by-email endpoint
Also transform the ACMEIssuer into ZeroSSLIssuer implicitly if set to
the ZeroSSL endpoint without EAB (the ZeroSSLIssuer is needed to
generate EAB if not already provided); this is now possible with either
an API key or an email address.
* go.mod: Use latest certmagic, acmez, and x/net
* Wrap underlying logic rather than repeating it
Oops, duh
* Form-encode email info into request body for EAB endpoint
Co-authored-by: Francis Lavoie <lavofr@gmail.com>
2020-08-11 09:58:06 -05:00
type acmeCapable interface { GetACMEIssuer ( ) * caddytls . ACMEIssuer }